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blatant human rights violations if all are 
“American vital interests”? Yes, it can be 
done—but the argument is less clear.
Martel’s final principle is that the 
nation must strengthen alliances 
and partnerships to promote shared 
responsibilities effectively to solve global 
problems. Recognizing that American 
power is limited, Martel counsels against 
temptations toward either American 
overreach or American withdrawal on 
key global and regional problems.
Martel applies these principles to 
“current” foreign policy issues to 
illustrate their utility; the inevitable 
drawback to such relevance is the danger 
of “shelf life” interest, i.e., how long 
will readers care about or even recall 
foreign policy specifics from 2014? 
Conversely, some topics that seem 
important at the time of this writing 
(e.g., violent Wahhabism, Russian 
aggressiveness) receive little attention.
A weakness of generalized, historically 
centered summaries of policy decisions 
is the tendency to see, in retrospect, 
clear choices and definite paths, but 
to underestimate the uncertainty and 
angst that decision makers suffered. By 
contrast, specific case studies (e.g., the 
Cuban missile crisis, Vietnam, the 2003 
Iraq war, the 2008 economic crisis) al-
ways show the confusion and fear. Mar-
tel’s sweeping review gives surprisingly 
little attention to the fact that nearly 
all grand strategy decisions are made 
while under risk or amid uncertainty by 
those who are fraught with anxiety and 
apprehension, and constitute gambles on 
guesses rather than calm choices about 
how best to balance good principles and 
achieve optimal outcomes. Martel—who 
certainly understood the policy-making 
process—might have replied that the 
purpose of his final book was to advise 
policy makers and scholars on how such 
decisions should be made, rather than to 
describe how they will feel while doing 
so. But readers might have benefited 
from at least an acknowledgment of 
this apprehension, the way Bill Martel 
used to offer a cheerful but sympathetic 
smile to friends and students struggling 
with problems he had posed to us.
The date of this book’s release—12 
January 2015—was the day its author 
died at the age of fifty-nine after a 
yearlong battle with leukemia. Bill 
Martel was for ten years a professor 
of international security studies at the 
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy 
at Tufts University (where he received 
the James L. Paddock award for teaching 
excellence) and an adjunct electives 
professor at the Naval War College. 
Previously, he had taught in the College’s 
National Security Decision Making 
Department for half a dozen years, 
following a similar period as founding 
director of the Air Force’s Center for 
Strategy and Technology at the Air War 
College. He also had served as an adviser 
to the National Security Council and the 
Romney 2012 presidential campaign. 
This reviewer was one of his many 
colleagues and students who counted 
themselves blessed by his friendship.
THOMAS GRASSEY
The Struggle for Sea Power: A Naval History of 
the American Revolution, by Sam Willis. New 
York: W. W. Norton, 2016. 608 pages. $35 (Kindle 
$16.05).
Sam Willis describes (p. 5) the war for 
American independence as “the most 
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intriguing naval story in history.” To 
support this contention, Willis has 
written a book aimed primarily at a gen-
eral audience and based on a narrative 
approach, first chronicling the maritime 
conflict between Britain and its rebel-
lious American colonies, then address-
ing the ensuing global maritime war.
Although the book is written as a 
chronological narrative, Willis identi-
fies five underlying themes that knit 
the maritime story of the war into a 
broadly defined seapower thesis.
The first theme involves the author’s 
assertion (p. 5) “that sea power can exist 
without navies.” Although lacking Brit-
ain’s established naval infrastructure, the 
colonists, Willis argues, still developed 
and exploited sea power. This theme 
dominates the text during the early years 
of the war, but regrettably becomes but a 
minor story line after the French entry.
The second theme argues (p. 6) that 
naval historians generally “make a 
false distinction between” saltwater 
and freshwater navies in places such 
as Lake Champlain. Willis claims that 
contemporaries made no such distinc-
tion. Certainly, Willis is correct to point 
out similarities between the types, but 
the differences are more significant 
than Willis admits, particularly in the 
instruments used and the obstacles 
faced. Even more than the first theme, 
this one is episodic and hardly 
merits being elevated to a theme.
Willis’s third theme focuses on the 
global nature of the war. Willis clearly 
demonstrates that much more was 
at stake than the independence of 
thirteen of Britain’s North American 
colonies. This theme is addressed 
quite effectively after 1778 through a 
traditional narrative of naval operations.
The global nature of the war meant 
that numerous campaigns occurred 
simultaneously, and events in one region 
influenced what occurred elsewhere. 
This is Willis’s fourth theme. Willis 
provides insightful commentary on 
such interactions when explaining fleet 
movements and campaigns, but devotes 
too little attention to the decision 
making in London and Paris. To 
understand truly the interaction among 
theaters, Willis needed to explain more 
effectively how leaders in Paris, London, 
and Madrid prioritized among compet-
ing options. For example, Willis fails to 
grasp the nuances of Britain’s strategic 
position, including the calculus used in 
determining the distribution of fleets 
between home and foreign waters, and 
particularly the essential role of Gibral-
tar in Britain’s strategic architecture.
The fifth and final theme is the most 
far-reaching. It addresses how sea power 
affected the broader war—whether 
through diplomacy, campaigns on 
land, the politics of the states involved, 
or particularly the decisions of the 
military and political leadership. “As 
always,” Willis maintains (p. 292), 
“the impact of sea power must be 
measured in more ways than one.”
Willis aptly argues that sea power was 
a significant element in the American 
Revolution that should not be over-
looked. It influenced events from the 
war’s origin to its end. Yet although he 
often supports his arguments with a high 
degree of skill, the book fails to entirely 
meet its potential. Willis is not the first 
to address sea power and its relation to 
this war, but he does not place his thesis 
into the context of previous works on 
the subject. This is particularly glaring 
with regard to Alfred Thayer Mahan. 
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Willis cites only Mahan’s book on the 
American Revolution; he does not cite 
The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 
1660–1783, Mahan’s most significant 
work and the one that put the term “sea 
power” into widespread use. Consider-
ing that Willis has written a book about 
sea power and even uses (p. 6) the 
phrase “the influence of sea power,” the 
omission is evident. Although Willis 
defines sea power more broadly than 
does Mahan, many of The Influence of 
Sea Power’s themes echo powerfully in 
his work. Like Willis, Mahan considers 
the global maritime war spawned by the 
struggle for American independence to 
be the most intriguing of naval wars.
The second, related weakness involves 
the quality of the scholarship. Although 
Willis uses archival and published 
primary sources, he often relies on other 
historians. This is particularly true 
regarding memorable quotations from 
those who were present. Rather than 
consistently consulting original sources 
for both the accuracy and the historical 
context of the quotes, Willis relies on 
the legwork of previous historians.
Overall, Willis has written an intriguing 
appraisal of sea power in the American 
Revolution. It is a sweeping narrative 
that benefits greatly from Willis’s 
eloquence as a writer and his superb 
ability to tell a story. However, the 
book is not without its weaknesses. 
Some of the author’s themes require 
development, the source base could 
be strengthened, and Willis needed to 
develop stronger links between naval 
operations and the decision making 
by those at the highest positions in 
government. The book is on its surest 
ground in the early chapters when ad-
dressing the development of American 
sea power, and later in the text when 
recounting major naval operations.
KEVIN D. MCCRANIE
O U R  R E V I E W E R S
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